New Developments in the NLRB Deference to Arbitration by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1972 
Issue 3 Symposium: One Hundred Years of the Fourteenth Amendment—Its Implications for the 
Future 
January 1972 
New Developments in the NLRB Deference to Arbitration 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
New Developments in the NLRB Deference to Arbitration, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 555 (1972). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NLRB
DEFERENCE TO ARBITRATION
The National Labor Relations Act, as enacted in 1935 and as
amended in 1947 and 1959,1 had the dual purpose of providing orderly
and peaceful procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes and
protecting the rights of workers and employers. 2 In pursuit of these
purposes, the National Labor Relations Board was empowered with ex-
clusive, though discretionary, jurisdiction over national labor affairs. 3
The Board has generally chosen to exercise its jurisdiction over labor
disputes, particularly those involving unfair practices under the NLRA,
and has deferred to private arbitration only in a limited number of cir-
cumstances. A recent decision, Collyer Insulated Wire,4 demonstrates
a shift in the Board's attitude from protecting the worker by vigorous
1. National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as NRLA] codified in
various sections of 29 U.S.C. (1970). The policy of the Act is stated in 29 U.S.C.
§ 151:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
2. See Ordman, The NLRA in 1969, N.Y.U. 22D ANNuAL CONF tENCE ON LABOR
11 (1970). See also the statement of purpose in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 102 (1970) which provides:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate
and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of
employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate
with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be
free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection ....
But see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970),
where the Court said that unions have come of age and hence the national labor policy
should no longer emphasize the protection of the nascent labor movement, but rather
the encouragement of collective bargaining and administrative techniques for the
peaceful resolution of industrial disputes.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
4. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1971).
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federal action to promoting industrial peace by encouraging private
settlements 5 and poses the possibility of more frequent Board deference
to private arbitration.
I. NATIONAL LABOR PoLiciEs TowARD ARBITRATION
Congress gave special recognition to the collective bargaining proc-
ess in the 1947 Labor-Management Relations Act.0 Section 201(a)
provides: "that it is the policy of the United States that sound and sta-
ble industrial peace . . . can most satisfactorily be secured by the set-
tlement of issues between employers and employees through the process
of conference and collective bargaining. . .. ,,7 Section 203 (d) states,
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective
bargaining agreement."'
Arbitration is a part of the collective bargaining process. The ne-
gotiating parties recognize when they make their collective bargaining
agreement that they may not have anticipated all contingencies and
that there may be many differences of opinion as to the proper appli-
cation of the contract's standards. Accordingly, agreements establish
grievance procedures, including arbitration, for the adjustment of com-
plaints and disputes arising during the term of the agreement. The au-
tonomous rule of law thus established contemplates that the dispute
will be adjusted by the application of reasonable interpretation of the
contract.9
5. For a discussion of the advantage of private settlements, see Shulman, Reason
Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. Ruv. 999, 1024 (1955):
The arbitration is an integral part of the system of self-government. And
the system is designed to aid management in its quest for efficiency, to assist
union leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure justice
for the employees. It is a means of making collective bargaining work and
thus preserving private enterprise in a free government. When it works
fairly well, it does not need the sanction of the law of contracts or the law
or arbitration. It is only when the system breaks down completely that
the courts' aid in these respects is invoked. But the courts cannot, by occa-
sional sporadic decision, restore the parties' continuing relationship; and their
intervention in such cases may seriously affect the going systems of self-
government.
6. Act of June 23, 1947, Pub. Law 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 61 Stat. 136
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 29 U.S.C.).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1971).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1971).
9. See Schulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 -ARV. L.
REV. 999, 1007 (1955).
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The legislative history of the Act indicated a strong Congressional
intent to encourage arbitration, but not compulsory arbitration:
Compulsory arbitration is the antithesis of free collective-bargaining
... the existence of compulsory arbitration laws not only eliminates
free collective-bargaining in situations where the parties are genuinely
at odds, but will frequently encourage one or both of the disputants to
make only a pretense of bargaining in anticipation of a more favorable
award from an arbitrator than would be realizable through their own
efforts. . . .Conciliation and mediation are instruments of free collec-
tive-bargaining, aids to the parties in arriving at voluntary and mutual-
ly acceptable settlements. Compulsory arbitration would discourage
their use in the same degree that it would lessen the inclination to bar-
gain freely in arriving at settlements in labor disputes. 10
Congress was concerned that the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement should be bound by the terms of the contract. The Senate
Report stated, "Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a
valid, binding and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step.
It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to
such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace."" Yet,
Congress rejected an attempt to compel parties to arbitrate, even where
arbitration was within the terms of the contract, by eliminating a pro-
vision in the Taft-Hartley bill which would have made failure to honor
an agreement to arbitrate an unfair labor practice.' 2
The Supreme Court has also indicated its concern with protecting
the vitality of the arbitral process. In the Steelworkers Trilogy,"3 the
Court emphasized that, as a matter of national labor policy, arbitration
was to be preferred to judicial action for resolving disputes alleging
contractual violations. Relying on section 203 (d) of the Act, Justice
Douglas stated, "That policy can be effectuated only if the means cho-
sen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective
bargaining agreement is given full play." 4 Later in the opinion, Jus-
tice Douglas observed, "The agreement is to submit all grievances to
10. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 101 (1947).
11. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947).
12. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
13. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warriors Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
14. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
Vol. 1972:555]
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arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.' '1t
More recently, in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770,"6 Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, noted the importance
that Congress has attached to the voluntary settlement of labor disputes
and particularly to arbitration. Justice Brennan went on to say that
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,17 in its exposition
of section 301(a), "went a long way towards making arbitration the
central institution in the administration of collective-bargaining con-
tracts." 8
"I. NLRB EXCLUSMTY IN CASES INVOLVING ARBITRATION
Jurisdiction Granted the Board Under NLRA
Although providing that private settlements were the desirable means
of promoting industrial peace, the NLRA also granted the National
Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over unfair labor practice disputes.
Under section 10(a) of the NLRA of 1935:
The Board is empowered.., to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice .... This power shall be exclusive, and shall
not be effected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, code, law or other-
wise .... 19
Section 10(a) was intended to make clear that, although other agencies
may be established by code, agreement or law to handle labor disputes,
such other agencies could not divest the NLRB of jurisdiction.20
15. Id. at 568.
16. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
17. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18. 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
20. See, LEGISLATrE HISTORY OF THE NAnTONAL LABOR RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at
1301 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The original Senate printing of LEGISLATivE HISTORY contained a different section
10(b) which was never enacted. This section evinces the Senate's intention to test
inclusive discretionary jurisdiction in the Board.
The Board may, in its discretion, defer its exercise of jurisdiction over any
such unfair labor practice in any case where there is another means of pre-
vention provided for by the agreement, code, law or otherwise, which has not
been utilized. But in any case where the Board has so deferred, the Board
may at any time thereafter institute proceedings under this Act in order to
assure the effectuation of the policy of this Act and the development of a
uniform body of administrative interpretation and practice with respect to
unfair labor practices as defined herein.
[Vol. 1972:555
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In the amendments contained in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,21
Congress modified the exclusive nature of the Board's power to remedy
unfair labor practices by eliminating the words "shall be exclusive"
and by adding a proviso empowering the Board to cede jurisdiction to
a state or territorial agency under certain conditions:
By retaining the language which provides that the Board's powers under
Section 10 shall not be affected by other means of adjustment, the con-
ference agreement makes clear that, when two remedies exist, one be-
fore the Board and one before the courts, the remedy before the Board
shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, other remedies. 22
Professor Morris maintains 23 that the NLRB has exclusive and pri-
mary jurisdiction over the adjudication of unfair labor practices, except
where it cedes jurisdiction as provided in section 10(a) or declines ju-
risdiction as provided in section 14(c).24 The Board may give effect
to private agreements to settle disputes by allowing the parties a full
opportunity to reach a voluntary accommodation without governmental
intervention. 25
Exclusivity Doctrine of the Board
Because the Steelworkers Trilogy2 6 dealt with the relationship of ar-
bitration to the courts rather than to the Board, the Board has not felt
bound to follow those decisions. Instead, the Board has concluded
21. See note 5 supra.
22. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947).
23. C. MoRus, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 441 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
MORIS].
24. NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. 164(c)(1) (1970), provides:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assertjurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of em-
ployees, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its
jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction
over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
25. However, the right to resort to the Board for relief against unfair labor prac-
tices cannot be foreclosed by private contract. See Machinists Local 743 v. United
Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964):
The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the
public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices. ...
This public interest in preventing unfair labor practices cannot be entirely
foreclosed by a purely private arrangement, no matter how attractive the
arrangement may appear to be to the individual participants.
26. See note 13 supra.
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that recognition of arbitration agreements is a matter within its com-
plete discretion. Emphasizing section 10(a) of the Act, the Board
has held that jurisdiction, once established in all other respects, is not
to be affected by an agreement entered into by private parties.21
In representation disputes, Congress has directed the Board to de-
fine the bargaining unit in such a way as to "assure to employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchap-
ter."'28  Since the proper representation is essential to the collective bar-
gaining process, the Board has rarely deferred to an arbitrator.29 The
tenacity of the Board is illustrated by the final disposition of Carey v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.30  The Supreme Court held that the
NLRB should defer to arbitration proceedings in a jurisdictional dis-
pute until an award had been made. The Court determined that griev-
ance procedures furthered the policies of the NLRA, and that the Board
should actively encourage voluntary settlements of work assignments."'
After the arbitrator's award was rendered, the Board asserted its juris-
diction:
[Tihe ultimate issue of representation could not be decided by the arbi-
trator on the basis of his interpreting the contract under which he was
authorized to act, but could only be resolved by utilization of Board
criteria for making unit determinations. 32
Because of the important public interest considerations in determin-
ing the bargaining unit, the Board continues to adhere to its exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine by refusing to defer to arbitration in representation
disputes."3  In Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co.,34 a union was charged with
discriminating against members of a sister local who were transferred
27. NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 981 (1956); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
29. See Pullman Indus., Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 580 (1966); Hotel Employers
Assoc., 159 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1233
(1964); Insulation & Specialties, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1540 (1963). But see Raley's
Supermarkets, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 256 (1963), where the Board did defer to the ar-
bitrator.
30. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
31. Id. at 266.
32. 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 771 (1967).
33. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers Local 162, 151 N.L.R.B. 195 (1965); Carpenters
Dist. Council, 150 N.L.R.B. 991 (1965); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 7, 150 N.L.R.B.
461 (1964); News Syndicate, 141 N.L.R.B. 578 (1963).
34. 162 N.L.R.B. 48 (1966). See Carpenters Local 189, 162 N.L.R.B. 950 (1967).
[Vol. 1972:555
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into the first union's jurisdiction. The Board reiterated its position that
there was no policy reason to defer. Grievance arbitration procedures
in the contract between the employer and the first union failed to pro-
tect the interests of the transferred members of the sister local. More
recently, in Dayton Typographic Service, Inc.,3 5 the Board would not
defer to arbitration where the employer denied the right of a union
representative to attend a quality control meeting. At issue was the ex-
tent to which union representation also applied to day-to-day dealings
with the employees.
The Board has not deferred to arbitration in disputes involving
discriminatory practices brought under sections 8(a) (3),11 8 (a) (4) 1
or 8(b) (2)38 of the Act,39 and the courts have approved this policy.
The Fifth Circuit held in Teamsters Local 5 v. NLRB 40 that the NLRB
has jurisdiction of unfair labor practice proceedings against a union
35. 176 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1969).
36. NLRA § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970), provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ....
37. NLRA § 8(a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (4) (1970), provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee be-
cause he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
38. NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ....
39. A. Finkl & Sons Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 826 (1970); Eastern Ill. Gas & Securities
Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639 (1969); McLean Trucking Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 440 (1969);
Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 466 (1968); Star Expansion Indus. Corp.,
164 N.L.R.B. 563 (1967); Fiasco Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 611 (1967); Hodcarriers
Local 300, 159 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1966); Woodlawn Farm Dairy Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 48
(1966); Auburn Rubber Co., 156 N.LR.B. 301 (1965); Hoisting Eng'rs Local 701,
152 N.L.R.B. 49 (1965); Aerodex Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964); Electric Motors &
Specialties Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 131 (1964); National Screen Prods. Co., 147 N.L.R.B.
746 (1964); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964); Lummus Co.,
142 N.L.R.B. 517 (1963).
However, in Schott's Bakery, Inc., 164 N.L.R.B. 332 (1967) and Howard Elec.
Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 338 (1967), the Board deferred to an arbitration award which
dealt with the alleged unlawful discharges consistently within the policies of the Act.
40. 389 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1968).
Vol. 1972:555]
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which violated the rights of its members under the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA). Again, in Steves Sash & Door, Inc.,41 the
same circuit held that the Board properly declined to defer to arbitration
in a case involving the discharge of an employee for union activity.
The Board has been fairly consistent in exercising jurisdiction over
cases, involving refusal to bargain collectively under either section 8(a)
(5)42 or section 8(b)(3) 43. These cases generally have arisen in one
of two situations: where one party has refused to provide necessary in-
formation thereby preventing effective bargaining; or where the em-
ployer has taken some form of unilateral action without consultation
with the union.
In NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,44 the Supreme Court held that the
Board has jurisdiction before arbitration to order an employer to fur-
nish the union with information needed for determining if the collective
bargaining agreement has been violated. The Court stated, "the asser-
tion of jurisdiction by the Board in this case in no way threatens the
power which the parties have given the arbitrator to make binding in-
terpretations of the labor agreement. '45  The Board has taken a position
consonant with Acme, refusing to defer to cases involving the right to
relevant information, and has been affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.40
The Board tends to retain exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving
unilateral actions, though no definitive rationale for its position has
been developed. Between 1960 and 1967, the Board decided sixteen
out of twenty unilateral action disputes involving the duty to bargain. 7
41. 430 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1970). In accord with Illinois Ruan Transport Corp.
v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1955); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945).
42. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
43. NLRA § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
44. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
45. Id. at 438.
46. P.R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1970). See Scandia
Restaurants, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 326 (1968) for the Board not deferring to arbitration,
but rather requiring relevant information furnished.
47. For a discussion of these cases, see Note, The NLRB and Deference to
Arbitration, 77 YALE LJ. 1191, 1213 (1968).
The 16 cases decided on the merits are: Adelson, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 365 (1967);
Gravenslund Operating Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 513 (1967); W.P. Ihrie & Sons, 165
N.L.R.B. 167 (1967); Scam Instrument Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 284 (1967); American
Fire Apparatus Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1318 (1966); Central Rufina, 161 N.LR.B. 696
[Vol. 1972:555
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They refused to defer despite the existence in each case of an arbitra-
tion clause covering contract interpretations. In asserting jurisdiction,
the Board usually advanced any one of a number of reasons: neither
party to the contract had invoked the arbitration process; the respond-
ent had frustrated the arbitration process by refusing to process the
grievance; the contract was clear and unambiguous; the charging party
had not waived its right to bargain about the change in working condi-
tions; and the arbitrator could not resolve the dispute.48
Exceptions to the Exclusivity Doctrine of the Board
It is now well settled that where an arbitration award has already
been rendered, the Board will honor the award if it meets certain
standards. 49  In the landmark case, Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,50 an
unfair labor practice charge was filed following an arbitration award
rendered as part of a strike settlement. The NLRB refused to review
the case, stating:
The proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had
agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not
clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act. In these cir-
cumstances, we believe that the desirable objective of encouraging the
(1966); Crescent Bed Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 296 (1966); C & S Industries, Inc., 158
N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); American Sign Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 537 (1965); Century
Papers, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 358 (1965); Huttig Sash & Door Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1567
(1965); Cloverleaf Div. of Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964); Leroy
Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950
(1964); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964); Square D Co., 142
N.L.R.B. 332 (1963).
The 4 cases in which the Board deferred are: Vickers, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 561
(1965); Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1964); Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B.
1311 (1963); Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418 (1962).
48. See Consolidated Freightways Corp., 181 N.L.R.B. 856 (1970) (jurisdiction
asserted despite grievance arbitration procedure; it appearing that no grievance had
been filed with regard to these issues); Iron Workers Local 229, 183 N.L.R.B. No. 35
(1970) (failure to exhause grievance-arbitration procedures is neither bar to unfair
labor practices proceeding nor defense to unfair labor practice); Cello-Foil Prods.,
Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 679 (1969) (Board will not defer since mere existence of grielance-
arbitration procedure is insufficient to warrant deferral, particularly where arbitration
has not been invoked and time to do so has long passed); United Aircraft Corp.,
180 N.L.R.B. 278 (1969) (presence of arbitration agreement does not oust NLRB
from its power to act especially where parties themselves have chosen not to resort to
arbitration).
49. MoRRs, supra note 23, at 489.
50. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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voluntary settlement of labor disputes will best be served by our recog-
nition of the arbitrator's award.5l
Thus, the Board has established at least one exception to the exclusive
jurisdiction doctrine. When an arbitration award has already been
fairly rendered,52 the Board's jurisdiction to settle unfair labor disputes
need not be exercised. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
firmed the discretion vested in the NLRB to accept or reject an arbi-
trator's award: "[T]he Board has the discretion to defer to the de-
cision of an arbitrator. [The court's] function in reviewing such
cases is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion in so de-
ferring."' 5
While the Board as a general rule will exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over unfair labor practice cases involving unilateral action 4 the Board
has deferred under certain circumstances. Board deference is sup-
ported on the theory that arbitration is the remedy for which the parties
have bargained; the Board's refusal to take action on the complaint en-
courages the parties to exhaust their private remedies and adhere to
the terms of their contracts. This process is in conformity with the
policies set out in the Labor-Management Relations Act. 5 Still, the
Board has the statutory power to prevent persons from engaging in any
51. Id. at 1082. In deferring to arbitration awards the NLRB went even further
in International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 927 (1962), when the Board stated
If complete effectuation of the Federal policy is to be achieved ... the
Board ... should give hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process as
"part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself," and voluntarily
withhold its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice
changes involving the same subject matter, unless it clearly appears that the
arbitration proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness or seri-
ous procedural irregularities or that the award was clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the Act.
52. For cases in which the Board refused to defer to an arbitration award rendered,
see Steves Sash & Door, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 154 (1969); DC International, Inc.,
162 N.L.R.B. 1383 (1967); Hotel Employers Ass'n, 159 N.L.R.B. 143 (1966); Pull-
man Indus., Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 580 (1966); Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc.,
155 N.L.R.B. 447 (1965); Auburn Rubber Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 301 (1965); Youngs-
town Cartage Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 305 (1964); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
513 (1963); Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034 (1963); Gateway Transport
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1962); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1087 (1961);
Ford Motor Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961); Hershey Chocolate Co., 129 N.L.R.B.
1052 (1960); Honolulu Star-Bulletin Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395 (1959).
53. Ramsey v. N.L.R.B., 327 F.2d 784, 787-88 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. See notes 45 and 46 supra and accompanying text.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 171(a) (1970).
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unfair labor practice,56 and deferring to arbitration may arguably com-
pel the parties to arbitrate.5 7
The first case concerning unilateral action in which the Board de-
clined to assert jurisdiction was Consolidated Aircraft Co.,5 which in-
volved a company order establishing working hours without consulta-
tion with the union. When considering the union's charges, the Board
stated:
We are of the opinion, however, that it will not effectuate the statu-
tory policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining" for the Board to assume the role of policing collective con-
tracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting to de-
cide whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such
contracts constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. On the con-
trary, we believe that parties to collective contracts would thereby be
encouraged to abandon their efforts to dispose of disputes under the
contracts through collective bargaining or through the settlement pro-
cedures mutually agreed upon by them, and to remit the interpretation
and administration of their contracts to the Board.59
The Board spelled out the basis for deference to arbitration in Jos-
eph Schlitz Brewing Co.6 The issue was whether the employer, im-
plementing a change in relief periods during the term of the contract,
failed to comply with section 8(d)6 1 requirements and thereby violated
section 8(a) (5)0G- and 8(a)(1) 63 of the Act. The Board found that
there had been a long established and successful bargaining relation-
ship and no other alleged unlawful conduct by the parties. There was
56. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
57. See note 9 supra and accompanying text
58. 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).
59. Id. at 706.
60. 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
61. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) provides in part:
... to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms
and conditions of employment ....
62. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of em-
ployees ....
63. NLRA § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970) provides in part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 ....
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no anti-union motivation in the actions of the employer, and the dis-
pute arose out of good faith assertions of contractual rights.04  The
Board held that the employer had acted reasonably throughout the
process of altering its operations and stated:
Thus, we believe that where, as here, the contract clearly provides for
grievance and arbitration machinery, where the unilateral action taken
is not designed to undermine the Union and is not patently erroneous
but rather is based on a substantial claim of contractual privilege, and it
appears that the arbitral interpretation of the contract will resolve both
the unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue in a
manner compatible with the purposes of the Act, then the Board should
defer to the arbitration clause conceived by the parties. This particu-
lar case is indeed an appropriate one for just such deferral. 6
If the action is not designed to undermine the union, is not patently
erroneous, but is substantially privileged under the contract, and is dis-
cussed with the union, the Board, utilizing the Schlitz doctrine, will in
its discretion defer to the arbitration clause in the contract.
III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFERRING To ARBITRATION
PROCEDURES: COLLYER INSULATED WIRE
The dispute in Collyer Insulated Wire0 involved purported viola-
tions of section 8(a) (5)67 and 8(a) (1)68 of the NLRA arising from
unilateral changes in certain wages and working conditions. The em-
ployer responded with the contention that the changes were sanctioned
under the contract, and, in the alternative that any of its actions in ex-
cess of contractual authorization should have been remedied by the
grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the contract. The
Board dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the dispute was es-
sentially over the terms and meaning of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and that the parties should be required to settle the dispute pur-
suant to the provisions of the contract. The Board, however, did re-
tain jurisdiction for the purpose of entertaining an appropriate and
timely motion for further consideration if, (a) the grievance was not
resolved with reasonable promptness or submitted to arbitration, or (b)
64. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 141 (1969).
65. Id. at 142.
66. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1971).
67. See note 60 supra.
68. See note 61 supra.
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the arbitration procedures were unfair or irregular, or reached a result
repugnant to the Act.69
Of particular importance to the Board was the fact "that the circum-
stances of [Collyer], no less than those in Schlitz weigh[ed] heavily
in favor of deferral."7 The parties had a long and mutually beneficial
history of collective bargaining, and the operative contract provided a
means for resolving the dispute. Furthermore, the Board found def-
erence to arbitration with retained jurisdiction compatible with the
Spielberg doctrine, encouraging the parties to achieve a final settle-
ment. In this light, the Board viewed its decision, not as enforcing
compulsory arbitration, but as requiring the parties to honor their con-
tractual obligations.
Member Brown, in his concurring opinion, would go even further.
He stated, "[t]he deferral policy should be applied to disputes covered
by the collective-bargaining agreement and subject to arbitration
whether the disputes involve alleged violations of Section 8(a)(5),
(3), or (1) or whether brought by the employer, the union, or an em-
ployee."'r7 In his view, it makes no difference whether there has been
an arbitration award or not. If the dispute encompasses matters which
are covered under the collective bargaining agreement and does not in-
volve the acquisition of new rights, Member Brown would defer to the
arbitration process provided in the contract.
Member Fanning, in his dissent, felt the employer's actions were
proper subjects for collective bargaining and that by these changes, the
company violated sections 8(a) (5) and 8(a) (1) of the Act. The Act
gives the Board clear authority to rule upon unfair labor practices de-
spite the availability to the parties of private arbitration. 72  However,
the majority's insistence that the parties' statutory rights cannot be ad-
judicated in this case, except through the authority of an arbitrator,
verges on the practice of compulsory arbitration, which is clearly con-
trary to the Congressional intent.73
69. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1932
(1971).
70. Id. at 1936.
71. Id. at 1939.
72. Id. at 1941.
73. Id. See Address by NLRB Member John H. Fanning, The Impact of
Collyer on Arbitration, Eighth Annual Labor-Management Conference on Collective
Bargaining and Labor Law, Feb. 5, 1972, in 79 LAB. REL. RaP. 163 (1972).
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Member Jenkins, dissenting, regarded the majority holding as a com-
plete reversal of Board precedent and urged return to the doctrine of
exclusive board jurisdiction. Relying on Amalgamated Association of
Street Electric Railway Employees v. Lockridge,74 in which the Su-
preme Court held the Taft-Hartley Act preempted a state court's juris-
diction over a discriminatory practice action, he stated:
If the Supreme Court is unwilling to give to state courts jurisdiction to
decide suits which "arguably" involve an unfair labor practice under the
Act and at the same time involve a contract interpretation issue, this
Board can hardly relinquish its paramount jurisdiction to a private tri-
bunal or to an arbitrator whose decision by definition has no preceden-
tial value, whose determination may not decide or touch upon the stat-
utory violation, and whose award may not remedy present statutory
violations and cannot control future conduct, however unlawful the
present conduct may have been. . . . Lockridge is conclusive au-
thority that the Board lacks the power to take even the first step toward
relinquishing or undermining its jurisdiction. 75
IV. FUTURE PROJECTIONS OF THE COLLYER DOCTRINE
In the NLRB General Counsel's words, "the key to an understand-
ing of the Collyer case lies in the 'circumstances' of that and the
Schlitz case."76  The applicability of the Collyer policy of deferral to
arbitration can be ascertained only by an examination of the various
circumstances on which the Board relied in choosing to defer.
First, the Board relied on the long and productive relationship be-
tween the union and employer in which they mutually and voluntarily
resolved the conflicts inherent in collective bargaining. 77 Because the
Board has discretionary power in deferring or refusing to defer to arbi-
tration, rather than making a substantive unfair labor practice finding,
the Board may consider past settlements of unfair labor practice
charges, strikes and lockouts, and arbitration experience of the par-
ties.7" The length of time that the parties must enjoy amiable rela-
74. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
75. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1945 (1971).
76. Address by NLRB General Counsel Peter G. Nash, First Questions From
Collyer, FMCS-AAA Regional Conference on Labor Arbitration, Oct. 15, 1971, in
78 LAB. REL. REP. 159, 160 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL COUNSEL].
77. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 (1971).
78. Arbitration Deferral Policy under Collyer, Memorandum of NLRB General
Counsel Peter G. Nash to NLRB Regional Directors and Officers-in-Charge, 49 BNA
DAILY LABOR REPORT 6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MEMO].
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tions in order to assure Board deference has not been determined.
The Board, however, may consider the remoteness of either cooperative
or uncooperative conduct and may offset a history of conflict with evi-
dence of recent improvements in relations. 79 The Board has reiterated
the importance of a continuing collective bargaining relationship in its
decision to defer in Titus-Will Ford Sales.80
Second, the Board pointed out in Collyer that, as in Schlitz, "no
claim is made of enmity by respondent to employees' exercise of pro-
tected rights."' Accordingly, the extent to which the Collyer deferral
policy will apply to discriminatory practices under section 8(a) (1)
and (3) is questionable. The General Counsel feels that it could be
argued that all 8(a)(3) and most of 8(a)(1) violations involve some
form or degree of enmity and, therefore, are outside of Collyer.82 Nev-
ertheless, the Board's reliance on Spielberg, an 8(a) (3) case defer-
ring to arbitration may make this a viable issue. Prior to Collyer, in
Curtis Manufacturing Co.,81 the Board refused to defer to arbitration,
stating that discharge for discriminatory anti-union reasons is an issue
peculiarly within the NLRB's expertise. In a more recent case, Tulsa-
Whisenhunt Funeral Homes,8 4 the union contended that the employer
had unlawfully discharged employees. The Board again refused to defer
to a discriminatory practice claim, despite an ad hoc agreement between
the parties which covered the situation. While the Board has not ex-
plicitly precluded application of the principles espoused in Collyer to
alleged section 8(a) (3) violations, it is improbable that the Board will
defer to such cases in light of its consistent refusal to do so in the
past.85 The Board has, also, declined to defer to an arbitration pro-
cedure provided in a collective bargaining agreement where the union
allegedly engaged in discriminatory practices in violation of section
8(2)(a). 0 The company was not a party to the complaint, and the
Board reasoned that resort to arbitration would not adequately repre-
sent the rights of the discharged employees.
79. Id.
80. 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1972).
81. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936
(1971).
82. GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 76, at 162.
83. 189 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1971). Although the case occurs prior to Collyer, it
is useful to illustrate recent Board policy with respect to unfair labor practices.
84. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1972).
85. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
86. Laborers Local 573, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1972).
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Third, in Collyer the Board relied on the employer's credible asser-
tion of the availability of arbitration under the terms of the contract.81
In Member Fanning's dissent, the point was raised that the arbitration
time had run under the terms of the contract and that compelling arbi-
tration of a grievance which is no longer contractually arbitrable verges
on compulsory arbitration. The majority opinion rejected this conten-
tion, holding that it was merely giving full effect to the arbitration
agreement between the parties.8 8  It is still undecided what the Board
will do if the respondent is willing to arbitrate during the contractual
period for filing a grievance and arbitration, but refuses to arbitrate
after the expiration of this period.8 9 Nevertheless, the Board in Collyer
did retain jurisdiction with the plain implication that the employer must
arbitrate to avoid further Board consideration. One of the reasons for
not deferring in Curtis Manufacturing Co. was the employer's intention
to argue before the arbitrator that the grievance was not filed timely
under the terms of the contract.90
Fourth, an unfair labor practice charge will not be deferred for arbi-
tration under the Collyer doctrine unless the contract provides that the
procedures culminating in binding arbitration are the exclusive means
for settlement of the dispute. The General Counsel has stated, "the
Collyer policy of deferral is viewed as predicated not on the availability
of arbitration to the charging party, but on the charging party's having
prospectively and voluntarily obligated itself by contract to seek redress
by no means other than arbitration in contract disputes with the re-
spondent." 91  The Board did not defer in Tulsa-Whisenhunt, where
the collective bargaining agreement did not commit either the employer
or the union to third party arbitration. 92 But where the contract con-
tains a grievance procedure which provides that all misunderstandings
or disputes of any character relative to interpretations of matters cov-
87. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1937
(1971).
88. Id.
89. MEMO, supra note 78, at 3. The majority of the Board considered the ques.
tion of limits on the filing of grievances to have been irrelevant to its decision. It
was enough for the Board's purpose that the respondent was willing to arbitrate de.
spite any time limitations contained in the contract. So viewed, the Board's decision
indicates that a party which seeks deferral of a charge for arbitration must be
willing to waive any arbitration time limitations which the contract may contain.
90. 189 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1971).
91. MEMO, supra note 78, at 5.
92. 195 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1972).
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ered by the agreement are to be finally resolved by binding arbitration,
the Board has recently deferred.9 3
Other circumstances in Collyer may be summarized:
[Tihe dispute is one eminently well suited to resolution by arbitration.
The contract and its meaning in present circumstances lie at the center
of this dispute. In contrast, the Act and its policies become involved
only if it is determined that the agreement between the parties ex-
amined in the light of its negotiating history and the practices of the par-
ties thereunder, did not sanction Respondent's right to make the dis-
puted changes, subject to review if sought by the Union, under the con-
tractually prescribed procedure. That threshold determination is clear-
ly within the expertise of a mutually agreed upon arbitrator.9 4
In the General Counsel's opinion, "not every alleged unfair labor
practice which may be subject to a grievance-arbitration procedure
should be deferred for arbitration; the Collyer policy may cover only
those disputes which involve the construction and application of sub-
stantive contract terms."95  The dispute must be centered on the terms
of the contract. The Board in Collyer indicated that the question of
deferral arises "only when a set of facts may present not only an al-
leged violation of the Act, but also an alleged breach of the collective
bargaining agreement subject to arbitration." 6  To warrant deferral
the underlying dispute must be encompassed by the arbitration pro-
visions of the contract. 97
CONCLUSION
At this time, with the extreme backlog of cases, the rising costs and
the increase in time necessary to take a dispute before the NLRB,9 8
the Board may be recognizing that the primary purpose of the Act, the
93. Great Coastal Express, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 129 (1972); Wrought Washer Mfg.
Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1972); Titus-Will Ford Sales, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1972).
94. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936
(1971).
95. GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 76, at 164.
96. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936
(1971).
97. For recent cases on this point see Titus-Will Ford Sales, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4
(1972); Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 14 (1972); Beer Distributors
Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (1972); Great Coastal Express, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 129
(1972).
98. Note, Contractual Interpretation, Unfair Labor Practices, and Arbitration:
A Proposed Resolution of Jurisdictional Overlap, 68 MhCH. L. Rnv. 141, 145 (1969).
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promotion of industrial peace, is better effectuated by deferring to the
arbitration procedures provided for in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. When the private settlement procedures will satisfy the purposes
of the Act, federal action in the form of the NLRB need not be utilized.
The General Counsel has stated that he will give operational effect to
Collyer. Thus, when the parties have contractually committed them-
selves to mutually agreeable procedures for resolving their disputes dur-
ing the period of the contract, full opportunity will be given to allow
these procedures to function. Recent cases are beginning to reflect
this policy. Where the dispute is found to involve the meaning and ap-
plication of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Board is frequently deferring to arbitration. 100 The policy of promot-
ing industrial peace and stability through collective bargaining requires
the parties to honor the contractual grievance and arbitration obligation
that they themselves have voluntarily established under binding com-
mitment.101
99. GENm, L CouNsEL, supra note 76, at 165.
100. See cases note 97 supra.
101. Titus-Will Ford Sales, 197 N.L.R.B. No. 4 (1972).
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